

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P O Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginsa 22313-1450 www.msplo.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.	
09/839,495	04/23/2001	Kiyoshi Matsutani	Q63352	2595	
65565 SUGHRUE-26	7590 09/01/2009 55550	EXAMINER			
2100 PENNS	LVANIA AVE. NW	BORLINGHAUS, JASON M			
WASHINGTO	ON, DC 20037-3213		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	
			3693	3693	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE	
			09/01/2009	PAPER	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Ī	Application No.	Applicant(s)		
	09/839,495	MATSUTANI, KIYOSHI		
	Examiner	Art Unit		
	JASON M. BORLINGHAUS	3693		

	JASON M. BORLINGHAUS	3693	
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the o	orrespondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED 28 July 2009 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPL	ICATION IN CONDITION FOR AL	LOWANCE.	
 The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must timely file one of the following i application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appe for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C periods: 	the same day as filing a Notice of A replies: (1) an amendment, affidavit eal (with appeal fee) in compliance	Appeal. To avoid abar t, or other evidence, w with 37 CFR 41.31; or	hich places the (3) a Request
a) \(\sum \) The period for reply expires \(\frac{0}{2} \) months from the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire to examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION.) See MPEP 766.07(f)	dvisory Action, or (2) the date set forth ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailing b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE	date of the final rejection	in.
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date have been filled is the date for purposes of determining the period city under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office tramay reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL.	on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.1: ension and the corresponding amount of chortened statutory period for reply origing than three months after the mailing date	of the fee. The appropria nally set in the final Office	ate extension fee e action; or (2) as
[X] The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed with AMENDMENTS.	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the	s of the date of appeal. Since
 ∑ The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, to a limit from the proposed amendment for the proposed and the proposed after for the proposed and the proposed after for the proposed and the proposed and for the proposed and for the proposed and propos	nsideration and/or search (see NOT w); ter form for appeal by materially red	E below); ducing or simplifying the	
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)). 4 The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12 5 Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): 6 Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all non-allowable claim(s).		,	,
7. A For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) I how the new or amended claims volud be rejected is prov The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed:		be entered and an e	xplanation of
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE 8. The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary 	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appea and was not earlier presented. Se	l and/or appellant fail e 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1	s to provide a).
 The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER 	n of the status of the claims after er	ntry is below or attach	ed.
The request for reconsideration has been considered but See Continuation Sheet.	t does NOT place the application in	condition for allowan	ce because:
12. ☐ Note the attached Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i> (s). (13. ☐ Other:	PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s).		
	/Jason M Borlinghaus/ Examiner Art Unit 3693		

Continuation of 11, does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: Applicant argues that the asserted prior at (Mockett and Gopinathan) fail to disclose or suggest an "apparatus" and all its attendant limitations. Applicant puts special emphasis on the term "apparatus" but Examiner is uncertain as to its significance, as the prior art discloses systems composed of physical devices (apparatuses) and suggests apparatus embodiments to perform the disclosed methods.

Applicant argues that the cited prior art fail to disclose "an apparatus" that performs the claimed functions. Examiner has repeatedly mapped portions of the cited prior art to the claim limitations and has gone to great lengths to respond to the policant's previous arguments. Does Applicant believe that the claimed subcomponent units (e.g. communication unit, processing unit, output unit) and the functions claimed are not present in the art? or, based upon the wording of the Applicant's arguments, it has Applicant arguing that although the subcomponent units and functions are present in the prior art, that they are being disclosed as a system or a method, rather than an "apparatus"?

Based upon the length at which the examiner and Applicant have discussed this issue, Examiner is forced to conclude that Applicant is arguing the second issue - that the disclosed subcomponents and functions are not disclosed as being part of "an apparatus" specificially. Examiner refutes that as as the prior art discloses systems composed of physical devices (apparatuses) and suggests apparatus embodiments to perform the disclosed methods. And even if such an assertion was true, it would have certainly been obvious to embody a system or method via an apparatus.

Applicant specifically argues that the prior art (Gopinathan) does not teach or suggest "communicating with both the server of a credit card firm and a server owned by a settling financial institution". However the secondary reference (Mockett) does disclose this feature as Mockett discloses communicating with a credi card server and a settling financial institution (automated clearing house or merchant bank). (see fig. 1: para, 17).

Applicant asserts that "Examiner does not distinguish among credit cards, bank ATM cards and the telephone calling cards." Examiner asserts that the primary reference (Gopintahn) while discussing other types of payment cards, such as bank ATM cards and telephone calling cards, does disclose that the "technqiues and principles discussed herein apply to other types of customer accounts, such as charge cards, bank automated teller machine cards and telephone calling cards." (see co.l. 1, lines 2 1 - 26). The secondary reference (Mockett) is directed toward credit cards. (see abstract). While the references disclose and discuss other payment cards, such does not disqualify them or make them any less applicable as prior art pertaining to the claimed invention.

Applicant recounts portions of the specification to illustrate the differences between the Applicant's invention and the prior art. However, although the argued elements may be found as examples and/or embodiments in the specification, they were to claimed explicitly in the disputed claim(s). Nor was the terminology used in the disputed claim(s) defined in the specification to require these limitations. A reading of the specification provides no evidence to indicate that these limitations must be imported into the claims by meaning to disputed terms. Therefore, although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181(Fed. Cir. 1993) and MPEP §211.10.

Applicant argues that the prior at does not disclose "taste information extracting means for extracting taste information of a user based upon shop use historical information, facilities user historical information with a reconstance in the credit card charge historical information." Gopinthan discloses the storage of shopping historical information (transactional patterns for the customer). Such information an consist of numerous variables, such as merchant category code or merchant per Dode. Such information is taste information as it denotes the user's preferences and patterns. Such taste information is extracted or retreived from a database by an information extraction means, (see oct.) 26. line 64 - oct. 77 line 15: oct. 27. line 64 - oct. 24t.